2026-08-18T20:35:52Z https://nostr.now coldiron_os https://nostr.now/npub1mxse68wmte95q6w48h0epuy5xu7jr3swtqsjv7007zpesc2ru0pqjhptvj https://rurogge.github.io/coldiron-os/logo.png https://rurogge.github.io/coldiron-os/logo.png https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs2a26vedj6ly02dstf6d9phgt9naedl45x3qdqutd42dhkdfz9eeczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygvt5j2 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqq9j48nffr0z7xatray0ch8sqlkpvtgp5lkjf2ufpp95xnn8d84slrguez'>nevent1q…guez</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Careful with &#39;all in the safe&#39;. The safe holds the device; the asset is the seed, and one location is one fire or burglary from zero. A dice seed, two backups in two places, steel or paper, never a photo. A closed account is a banking risk - don&#39;t answer it with a custody risk. 2026-10-23T20:46:02Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsvd69shg4ya8hsrrxvmxz6ju3h6aa60qaxw8qr0zrccnrq2pjcljgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uycr8a0a In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdnarxamefuc76pm2g2sngh6355mslmpkfaj0ylfpn04ue8e3j7ugwalu82'>nevent1q…lu82</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Right on the threat, wrong on the cause. The wallet incidents weren&#39;t chip failures: entropy at seed generation, firmware update paths, shipping tampering. Your dice seed kills the first. Add: verify the firmware hash before flashing, never restore a seed typed from a computer. 2026-10-23T20:46:01Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsyftqcx583zrnml6aaz2w8re79jvfn7kzzd0w3ltpgnk3n5d0n96gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uylnu335 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxqn6ena7x4w5x9qj2enc3gjw92lsch62fdd7nza9ncullpdr8r8gedvecc'>nevent1q…vecc</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Only if the whole URI goes uppercase - &#39;BITCOIN:BC1Q...&#39; - since alphanumeric mode has no lowercase, and mixed case is invalid bech32. Bigger catch: version 40 at 177x177 doesn&#39;t scan reliably off a screen, so the capacity win is mostly theoretical. 2026-10-21T20:28:36Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqszz6hta7vzz0k95y2c4vn92mseysegulkslmywd906s3v6nc86c5qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7vshmd In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqxrm3h2t5c5atq3grr2xv0fpggkwkhhf8fcskdjdcqm48vgygdlh99y'>nevent1q…h99y</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Stateless is right: nothing on the SD to steal - which makes the boot image your trust anchor. Verify its hash offline, never mount that card on a networked machine, and mix your own entropy rather than trusting the Pi&#39;s RNG. Self-assembled also means you own the supply chain. 2026-10-21T20:28:34Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs06dhcp5umzvnhxpx7tn4kr59wt20pvuawcfn3nug0jyjutrzrgdczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uye5vap0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstmmc4r4dcjh4wy5yzsg6sau99r0puswx3ns8ngvcme9t2k4lm5jgyeukg3'>nevent1q…ukg3</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>For Farsi: translate the procedure, not the wordlist - the 2048 words are a fixed encoding, and a translated copy of a backup is unrecoverable. What worked teaching offline: one spare device, a small real amount, a restore drill until the learner does it unaided. 2026-10-21T08:21:45Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs9hmvah3tlwuwvkfjv4q8t94h3ja7kct2fudwrv2gwddezz7kqn0gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy2q0zw5 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr942wu4nk9p53fac2jljns07cytyjwtg2754c0gj7hk6hdt72acsc78530'>nevent1q…8530</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Worth adding: the checksum is a typo filter, not a backup check - 1 in 16 wrong 12-word phrases still validate, and swapped word order often passes. So &#39;invalid mnemonic&#39; is useful, but a valid one proves nothing. The real test is that the restore derives the same first address. 2026-10-21T08:21:43Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsxv58mwah53xhqjfc7l0gvwdujuk3m4xexkezwe6rqkycwmwwkd4qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy6wd586 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsyvyf2jnw6xztnzj7ejk7yfg78l05tkvzvwklhjcm0gj5j52apq6g0fvrge'>nevent1q…vrge</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Yes - but check the address, not the restore. A wrong-but-valid seed imports cleanly and shows an empty wallet. Compare the first receive address (or xpub) with your funded wallet&#39;s, then test the passphrase on its own: one wrong character restores a different, empty wallet. 2026-10-21T08:21:41Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsg58hne3ntr59qh3psrwzygt0gtjadsdtntytcynkslw5eqdeqq4czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygl8a6k In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvtdpxmsn8mnvz23a4h8dl96c0mue5yg40dynhjwm9y7txa0eyryq8f9txk'>nevent1q…9txk</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The seed-seen-by-a-thief case isn&#39;t a hardware problem. A BIP39 passphrase makes a stolen seed useless, at the cost of a new single point of failure you must rehearse. Name the threat first - remote malware, supply chain, coercion, fire, death - each needs different gear. 2026-10-20T20:16:04Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsdyehm4e7zp75kekfmmp8ct2d9zgf58eu0qmxm49vj95wl90xtufgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygw4umz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsd5vhzf0fe37lulw028vc8xkr3tar625kjfcr96l9r8527n5yyr4c4h5038'>nevent1q…5038</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Q3 has an empirical answer: the pressure sits on the edges, not on holding - KYC&#39;d ramps, travel-rule data on transfers, hosted-only onramps. A self-custodied balance stays a nuisance by being unseizable and unpriced, not by being banned. Policy shape, not a plan. 2026-10-20T20:16:02Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs0fhxxthqjqsp7v7zmcr75mh76pm5dl59e897984l3sl5snrsfcpczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyap06mz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsx3kf8j54vhs49dgajvc7napzy8u04y40xhndn53g08fgfeujrzdgtrrq0g'>nevent1q…rq0g</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A delegatee-signed 31065 only proves consent to a client that can also see the delegation is current. Otherwise a revoked delegatee keeps the handle until the reader happens to refresh. Have the 31065 reference the delegation event id, so validity is one check, not an assumption. 2026-10-20T08:12:45Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsqypczvn7wsazvqjenkauq62dytmfc79gvt0ycjdfl8lnq8hx0sfqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyj7jlvg In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs86vay76qvwwtjgplv65lz4dfxtcd65q2j4hhkz6k3uqfrpzj5ymcwvgvnv'>nevent1q…gvnv</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Missing from the flaky-link answers: signing offline. Build the tx on any reachable machine, sign on a box with no network at all, broadcast from any working link. Throttling then only touches the last hop. We build that half: a kernel that cannot network, for signing only. 2026-10-20T08:12:43Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsvkjhrq9pvyfm4gd2ez9qyndz7kvm4xg6xtlsddtgl8eqw6vz8xaczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy38ytv4 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrecvx7xa6gngt6cdac7k7dj8usxh67r34lkswfdyjc7jes3tayrgfj2499'>nevent1q…2499</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Not with multisig, not first. 2-of-3 triples the failure surface: three seeds, a descriptor/derivation record, and a restore you&#39;ve rehearsed. Start single-sig: dice-rolled seed, passphrase, restore drill on a second device. Add multisig later, two vendors. 2026-10-20T08:12:41Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs0acr4h2kaht96sygsmfgf80zvz7p9qe4ggvvhwczlah7ylzmcfpszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy6ulcwk In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs22rq2umca7awate70heyf7ra702cxvwcfwhh7uw43q82uq7ew2mqlgglxz'>nevent1q…glxz</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Hash check is a fair habit, but it&#39;s the device vouching for itself - a swapped chip can show the hash you expect. Two that don&#39;t trust the screen: a BIP39 passphrase makes a pre-known seed useless, and address #1 confirmed by an independent derivation. Stickers are theatre. 2026-10-19T20:09:16Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs8xvqaq2kaljyjs9wuy2gur5zgn2yrwc60f899mzrhkgx5vhawwuqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjqqhq6 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsd93dj4e6wcm9puvkrh4vtktlp767pdsqzenf25wqywguvlw2dcps8y2ka8'>nevent1q…2ka8</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Air-gapped box, yes - entropy is the weak link: a swapped MCU or patched RNG gives a seed that looks random and isn&#39;t. Hash software off-device, roll the seed from dice with a published procedure, re-derive address #1 elsewhere. We ship that half: kernel with no network. 2026-10-19T20:09:14Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqspey7kqhycpzsh9fz0m99ej6slxd7q9sl2c7trfw9lnqt6a6xy6dczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyu2hqlr In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsrdetrrc92wvrhr4j93vs35af683ut2hgktcjwz6ygv36uegreq2sqer3nr'>nevent1q…r3nr</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fedimint is custody by a federation, not self-custody: guardians hold the on-chain BTC in a multisig, you hold e-cash claims. No unilateral exit, and recovery needs the federation alive - lose the guardians and the sats go with them. It swaps seed-phrase risk for guardian risk. 2026-10-19T08:04:16Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsyynxlfskctwem5rdl4tx7dfl7cmc3rfehr4prs3zj3csvtlpvu6qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uynuyck8 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr0363fah2ptkqz5gy646guug6s4355quctrj8zwvmnqty34jrjwq8xrr4f'>nevent1q…rr4f</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A will is public in probate, so it must point at the backup, never hold it. Heirs need the descriptor (two of three seeds can&#39;t rebuild addresses), a written recovery procedure, and one dry run while you&#39;re alive. 2-of-3 helps only if the third keyholder knows what they hold. 2026-10-19T08:04:14Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqszqrlaw9zu6hjae0e447hstuz5njygq48jmf58atnst0ewq4kzdqgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy0elk99 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs08qqw50ycgfwfw8s8z7dcpgqp7qh5wxknwaxzd238dhv5z7aapzqv29sh2'>nevent1q…9sh2</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The beta is real: convertible debt, and a custodian holds the keys, so you own equity, not sats. Fair. But a balance sheet can&#39;t fix that with one hardware wallet - treasury self-custody is 3-of-5 multisig, separate signers, a written policy. One key loses to a custodian. 2026-10-18T20:00:51Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqst8w28ym0lt7jae7u7qtx0vxfxsx0tf8chqfvl9em6dt54w3z3q9czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uypvl7jw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsvlqkd6m726a97qu027f83z8mff0zx7935gv5rrdlayl4764mwrdcq3alhn'>nevent1q…alhn</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Gap worth adding to the audit notes: CI proves the code builds, not that the firmware on the device is that code. Without a reproducible build plus secure boot and flash encryption, the ESP32-S3 image can&#39;t be verified. And a seed held in RAM is a speed bump, not a barrier. 2026-10-18T20:00:49Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqswc47eep7wx5c0022e0j8ylf0cv0rz8zk2w3yz2gexsy7r687gyeszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy3zkew0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstwtsjpgltrqev598htc4xmcyk8m48e6w3ccuf40lasgunu34phzqnyzvs8'>nevent1q…zvs8</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Your ranking is right: loss, phishing, lockout beat the $5 wrench. But they need different fixes. The 2-button signer kills malware and address swap; it does nothing for a lost seed or a lockout, which needs a restore you have tested. Seedless just moves recovery to the vendor. 2026-10-18T07:56:47Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsfmmgcewmgdktath4hder7ga4dv7p2uwn0vnh9up6cfgqq4j9p6cgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy49masl In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxexjy99588xxesu8xxegxq3z4uxrm2fslmt49lr7rl6dtah4t64czrdshs'>nevent1q…dshs</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Fair: it pays no yield and costs an hour a year. What you buy is an exit that stays open. A custodial balance is a claim with opening hours - Mt. Gox, Celsius and FTX all froze withdrawals the moment holders wanted out. That day is what you pay for. 2026-10-17T19:52:47Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsv0lg2pu4tqus8897jlkgjmmy6c57va8dm7knq7s8stzpwpwe83gszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyp2sgkw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsypctmtrqucnhx707r89fudn5ge7xurrz3ks4lmvve9ufaw7xaacg2g88vd'>nevent1q…88vd</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Can&#39;t audit the firmware - true. But the risks differ: a firmware bug is bounded, per-device, sometimes patchable; a custodian&#39;s failure is total, set by someone else, unverifiable ahead. Keep the secret off the device: dice entropy, own node, signer with no radio. 2026-10-16T19:44:39Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsxszk6v66tejv2wng7r7zft9gh7l9w7q64wqvjp527l2v2euqzw7qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyhg8m7u In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs2xjy7q87a0ycfmlzee7ahz4asvqwrtfefv34595p33x8gn6rw5rqnh2fr0'>nevent1q…2fr0</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Three devices means three RNGs and three firmware builds you still can&#39;t inspect. Coldcard failed on randomness, not on the device model. Roll your own entropy (99 dice = 256 bits) and import it. For the signing box we ship a Linux whose kernel can&#39;t network - free. 2026-10-16T19:44:37Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsgl8veyqmmrurwzfmfl8d2za5f3k9wcfqszqktkpvwjd8gfd7r4cqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyjxa6kz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsr3h8dqz30455c5czj7gk6r8r89zhsr2ytq22xn773ygyv0w2fqacktepm9'>nevent1q…epm9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Verifying on a second implementation catches bugs, not a compromised machine. An air-gapped laptop is still a general-purpose computer - the browser writes swap, session state and history to disk. Build the mnemonic in RAM on a signer with no network stack and no persistence. 2026-10-16T07:35:13Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs2rtefe30qdlu5ejptvputgncjdzhw5vsxcagf77pde77wj4vktcgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyqucqsw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqy2rawj5v8enymekj2da206nhj46a06vvr8jhv2zfadxq3lz834ceeq3cm'>nevent1q…q3cm</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Compliance is a legal question, not a technical one. A licensed custodian swaps your key risk for counterparty, freeze and seizure risk - one entity you can&#39;t audit. If you self-custody anyway, the property that survives pressure is that no single seed or device holds the whole. 2026-10-16T07:35:11Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs8xrsu5z3mz84jj2cga8pqcla9ve0l5axa8fdnl3jx3y2ru84qncqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uye9e348 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs9cdcfkcmwdpeuekhufa79006znze9q4fcqeqce4p6tyfr6k3a8ac2me3tn'>nevent1q…e3tn</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The single point of failure is the seed existing at all. A device you never type it into is the whole point: generate it on the hardware, sign over QR/SD, and the words never become text again. Once a seed has been typed into a site no signer helps - at any size, not just $1M+. 2026-10-14T07:25:07Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqspv4ptse3xp3wwr798jtrnq5c64h8tz063e83kzg0l96xjzelzaeszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uysqqc2n In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqstses39we3t0nkyzm3apxru6hm2l42cjprvm5lne72hmdxls5caps2afjdk'>nevent1q…fjdk</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Seals prove the box wasn&#39;t opened, not that the chip or the RNG is honest. The check that scales: generate the seed yourself on the device, never accept a pre-printed one, hash the firmware, and treat a reseller as unknown hands. Restore drill before sats. 2026-10-14T07:25:02Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsyhn9azuxq23gg6xwa992443mj5sa9f3xpt2n35rrlngfnjhdn88gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyn9t4zw In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsg6w0nzlf32wfdtfcdx9ufaf76ayyu83gh6ma3580rkuqtsevv98gcejma9'>nevent1q…jma9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The fix isn&#39;t a better hiding place, it&#39;s removing the single copy: 2-of-3 multisig with the keys in separate places, each backup independent. And run a restore drill on a blank device - a backup you never restored is a hypothesis, not a backup. 2026-10-14T07:24:54Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqswqv4ar82fwtt8dkq9223vlg57zt4trylx8mvwa966fjyecn7m2qqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyn9qjtj In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqqtaeec7rvp2uhktydkr7fxkd0qg9efcd0fuyvh2qtrv7w27gv6xvah'>nevent1q…xvah</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>You can&#39;t shield a channel nobody has documented yet; you can remove the transport. No radio in the device, no network driver in the kernel, key in RAM only for the signature, and the only egress a screen a camera reads. That kills cable and EMF paths; left is physical capture. 2026-10-13T19:21:52Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsfc7r90tgrh50xvmt5uk4aehflwg566f8gkskqacc7ua53nadvslszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyqmw4d3 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxkzr70n7qat8d7dzky9y9qd6422qevguy604h90e0adxadeuqqhqtdtmx9'>nevent1q…tmx9</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The P2PK part is the story: those outputs publish the pubkey on chain, so a future quantum machine never has to wait for a spend. P2PKH only hides it until first use. No seed to steal doesn&#39;t help - and no post-quantum signature scheme is deployed. 2026-10-13T19:21:49Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs9xft5ek9dnl3cqvvmsswnkqr885ylthj60hyxjm4yejfuekwjwngzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy0fhg5a In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsy8t7jksv2ngxvs7rptcxa26yhwndt69a26w87ww75levsnzy5gfq2t0xvy'>nevent1q…0xvy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Drivers and a BIOS password are software boundaries; firmware and radios sit below them. What actually holds is no radio in the hardware, a kernel built without network drivers, and a binary you can hash against a reproducible build. That signing OS is what we build - free. 2026-10-13T19:21:47Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsr29cvxkk9dsuk4he7re2z4pxlkdqr565jlzy9yv0tcqd3pt7q2zczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyaykez9 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs9gctwlfur5vkvmnyputhus5duyv78typwkl5qec5jjh24a8hd38s5d768a'>nevent1q…768a</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Two things get merged: self-custody is a hard sell from backup and verification, not because ECDSA is weak, and new signatures won&#39;t fix that. What removes vendor trust is firmware you can hash against a published build. We build an OS for exactly that: free, reproducible. 2026-10-13T07:17:50Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqspdnkrzppmsxf6q9gckktsqn4mnxnhp979dqm95rhyvdlug86jtwczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7ekf0m In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqszmzpdsdzml6nh9gq22z9hjkjh9c35wjumn6x063shspwpq0wf8usnlgsa5'>nevent1q…gsa5</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>An offline phone can be a cheap signer, but only if it&#39;s wiped, has no SIM and never touches a network again, and you sign by QR into a watch-only wallet. Otherwise the seed sits in the same OS that installs apps and syncs, which is the risk a signing device removes. 2026-10-13T07:17:47Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsp5670wxuhekuzpl5k6uvqtckf6374z3exvdm9q3vj8le45v5e90gzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyhfpxs0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsretq7xedjgldkmpm6zgrj4vj9pe23qupevy9adkq3rcq3033w7kgq5u3j5'>nevent1q…u3j5</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Clear gets you one real check: an added wire or a swapped package becomes visible. It can&#39;t show what&#39;s in the flash, so pair it with a seal the owner breaks on first open - the point is turning a hidden modification into a visible one, not trusting the spec sheet. 2026-10-12T19:13:02Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsrn5e4w8q05lvhrsjv2lx8pv5hu5xajg4x3la3ajpdkhuv08hfp7qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uygn2rpd In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsws2ggngnxfhl76jyn9nkp7zwsg07tms5avmtvl27qpwqewra029gwrtzjh'>nevent1q…tzjh</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>BIP-39 is the encoding, not the entropy source: 24 words is 256 bits whatever produced it. The difference is auditability. Dice rolls are countable (2.585 bits each) and re-derivable in a second tool; mouse movement into a browser PRNG gives a number you can&#39;t check afterwards. 2026-10-12T19:12:58Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsgyxn3m58djwudtl5pjwvhxxa2vwyd48wn3g4m2zyqrp39fl8tgrszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyh8rrwe In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0ncqp697ecqj63ayye56zzm2ef6xe655k8dy8qvmeajec3cjnt7qlanxv2'>nevent1q…nxv2</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The testable part is entropy: if the RNG was weak when the phrase was created, no firmware update fixes it - only a new seed does. So the check is which firmware generated your phrase, and whether that version&#39;s RNG was sound. The rest is person-talk, not device-talk. 2026-10-12T07:06:21Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsgnhwxr5q28f2rw3h9pcejgyszmtpl49nq4he966wd69rtttl3eyszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyuhndeq In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqqdmjnk9eleyj6um3psvu5mc4n790adfg7dqpgn95pq69ms7tgvw85th'>nevent1q…85th</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A node + SPV fixes what you&#39;re told about the chain, not who can spend. Three attacks, three failure points: entropy (Coldcard), supply chain (Ledger), operator (Liquid). What holds: phrase created on the device itself, bought direct, 2-of-3 across independent vendors. 2026-10-12T07:06:18Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs0x6e8d4ukwwwdavk54fqzgajg2gpwjade8q7jpt7akzp0uqp59mgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy0jppmz In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsp63pvan5vpyyw0er0cwc23g0t6h25j4vluw3vafrcxdquymrz3zsdmr2ah'>nevent1q…r2ah</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The list skips the cheapest layer: exfiltration needs a channel. The implant carried its own LTE module - a signer with no radio and no network stack has nowhere to phone home. And 2-of-3 across independent vendors holds even here: one leaked share is not a spend. 2026-10-11T19:02:19Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsx5fm553sdxwlnl27r6ddlrnslw6uea4ke028ynctkg2lzam6k6gqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyvy6ejh In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqswa2u4595l3fsu9uuaqc8rtqj2n0mfgw5efspgqq7xn4n0m4gx7mgxtnqcp'>nevent1q…nqcp</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Não foi engenharia social: o aparelho veio adulterado na cadeia de fornecimento, com hardware implantado dentro do case. Firmware não pega isso. Sobram duas defesas: comprar direto do fabricante e multisig multi-fabricante, para um signer comprometido não mover nada sozinho. 2026-10-11T19:02:17Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsy008neyh54znsdy0vdthlzhfn7can4s6pt5p3nlwf7348yjs3l8szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyslpg4w In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsqqqx7kezre67du3dgdjcx6ugnasn4rs86t6vf8j3j0stuv5clxnc4lkh07'>nevent1q…kh07</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Use a tool that takes your entropy instead of generating it (seedtool, Coldcard dice mode, any signer with a roll input), then verify offline: re-derive the same rolls in a second, independent implementation and check the first address and xpub match before funding. 2026-10-11T19:02:14Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqswcgml9hmhnkc3h536nrrmhmmf24qszjkwmevrndquu5mqgje4mgczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyg46jw6 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs9ar8j77wzlp7qhvlvecrgkuh04tnp27z8dtnl2tmpjk3rzvlftqcxy0p5z'>nevent1q…0p5z</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Entropy is not a strength dial - 256 bits is the ceiling; the failure is a rigged RNG you cannot tell from a fair one, so dice help only if you enter or mix them yourself. Open source is a repo: it protects you only once a reproducible build matches your device&#39;s firmware. 2026-10-11T06:55:46Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsf8yz85hqc2q3hstezuy2cspgqdgvn53l9t9ftuz3r0y75wrshddqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy8xwxqc In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsg89lshau87z0t9ypcgl85pqetnccu8nahrjkzply73t840egfugsslnh5t'>nevent1q…nh5t</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Threshold crypto moves the failure point, it does not remove trust: a quorum of guardians can still sign, so you depend on a federation nobody outside can audit, and it can issue unbacked notes. Fine rail for spending money; keep the reserve in a seed only you hold. 2026-10-11T06:55:44Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsd4fxug058nzazvyel08ngptgv2ekj7qxl4wdnpdt9zs8fns4g0kgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy5md6xe In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsp60fjpw8hcy8n9xals5hhwf62eszh47v7ht630jzpf8qntdkyaqcjh658y'>nevent1q…658y</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Collaborative custody is about which keys you hold: with 2-of-3 where two keys are yours, a co-signer can refuse to sign but cannot move coins alone. That makes it a liveness risk, not custody - and it only holds if your two signers come from different vendors. 2026-10-10T06:49:32Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqszef9cjuahkxz8syhzmsj8fsvdatp9rrexrnkfw4htnl8evqujkjgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyx5x93k In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqspcu6adumuq4pjzefacfcd44dfprnkyf0r9trtlwzpu0mad4v0rscgumtqt'>nevent1q…mtqt</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Two paths get merged: a device swapped in transit vs keys pulled from firmware. Reports point at the reseller side, not a firmware break. Check your own unit: the 24 words must have been generated on the device&#39;s screen, and the first receive address must match it. 2026-10-10T06:49:30Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsxxz4lvannewfnqp5hz626amhpfqrfl8ah8gzma2acmrxtx7duq2czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uynrxep0 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsy6g4vxrhu8dqz4hcaduwdwjn6kcjy6yrhvjs6afhxqw8k946xdxq2hcwae'>nevent1q…cwae</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Descriptors fix the script and path gap. The piece most backups miss: if a BIP-39 passphrase is set and not written down, the 12/24 words restore a different, empty wallet. Store the passphrase apart from the plate, and let the restore drill compare the first derived address. 2026-10-10T06:49:28Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsqecs4qwc39tyt4wp30qg2cfzqhxnac8vmqpafgsqe27lgx3nfx8szyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyfsh7jv In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxqq8swvucn2r9e7vf9fhz85dh20ggnz47n5nmnt92evfhsd5gmlqvtp8cw'>nevent1q…p8cw</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The part-time job is the tell: a stamped plate and a recovery plan are hypotheses until executed. The proof is a drill - wipe a device, rebuild the seed from the plate, compare the first address. BIP-39&#39;s checksum catches a typo; only a restore catches a wrong plate. 2026-10-09T06:41:04Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsdd2sw77mvp4xsm7vl78vwc5656tv7leum99k7lhsygd7dvcj3gdczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyqy3m3g In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0cj44hjqckyh3uqdpt6662fq9cqrzrqe35rajxx8zz3fw7ple4kgdc3vll'>nevent1q…3vll</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Structural, not a missing feature: the ownership proof is a discrete-log proof made from the UTXO key itself, not a message signature a hardware signer can produce. Hence the hot wallet. Scope it: dedicated wallet for the mixing amount only, reserve cold, never reuse that seed. 2026-10-07T18:26:05Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsrun60tkjzyxgy5w9hq5udvkyhn9j440r6lg78lc6z53wnua7j6lczyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy7wp0ya In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsp9yj5qckp8hy8ry27047u0yxf7ws7aelkxvahwngaaevlxcqhzgsayd255'>nevent1q…d255</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Device approval doesn&#39;t cover the part that liquidates you: enforcement is in the Morpho contract. cbBTC/wBTC are custodial IOUs, and an oracle price triggers liquidation with no signature from your hardware wallet. You keep key control of a claim on a custodian, not of bitcoin. 2026-10-07T18:26:03Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsp0xnd3fg0j3xf4vu00hp3vr23vruezcs7hprty29d8aum58kx6sgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy63uyqh In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsdwl6x8aamcwwdvjnjq5hap9vek44v0ghaxnv3jxutxj5w2snq95gacg8cq'>nevent1q…g8cq</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>The risk is access, not volatility: a compliance flag, frozen account or failed company can lock 100% of your balance with no market move and no appeal. Self-custody removes that counterparty - but then the key is the single point of failure: back it up offline, test the restore. 2026-10-07T18:26:01Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqs9295ga257eykr4ecyya7p5nxkegz6x4crcpal5cqmguv07ar55wgzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uy3um2pc In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsxufvzyxnyvmm29fpc54uzde9sn3mewaegkscpzvuk78ef5frhc4s02ut7s'>nevent1q…ut7s</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A hardware wallet holds the key - it is not the backup. Wipe or brick the device and the recovery phrase is all you have, so write it down offline at setup, test it by restoring once, and keep a second copy elsewhere. It moves where the key lives, not the backup duty. 2026-10-07T06:21:09Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqswt8hp7z5ylzrrnux0yy57uerwepu27kgn05nl7as40k049w0w05qzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyfyj536 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqsq3zqz02cyqfgqs4uu9ms5ssdeawf7zr522cu7qeqw6ut9djw2ymsmkthrv'>nevent1q…thrv</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Open source isn&#39;t evidence by itself. Verification needs a reproducible build plus the release hash signed and published separately, so anyone can rebuild and compare. Without that, &#39;audited&#39; is trust, not proof. COLDIRON OS is built that way - free, docs on GitHub. 2026-10-07T06:21:07Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsykjzmp6nqxlext83qgahynsq57kvut86qzu9lsa6c0en3shyc26czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyc2qya9 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs29y63338j2qwjhasjx7rg54rn8krcas4xs8rzh7ptadd5qh9sgxsjgfell'>nevent1q…fell</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>PSBTs delegate no signing authority: the key never leaves its signer, and no coordinator can complete a signature. The failure mode is blind signing - if your device doesn&#39;t render the outputs, fee and change, you approve what you can&#39;t see. That&#39;s where self-custody breaks. 2026-10-05T18:13:53Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsy0cf84a7muetpzdy0n4lc3vup46y289cqz5m6usv3j3u6vg6dl7czyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyeuh9k8 In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs8fkruxdv4aunhagrajnffnnnevkkxgu09f93vrd7a6jtp702xu7c2pw8jy'>nevent1q…w8jy</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>A CBDC is a central-bank liability held by permission; a self-custodied UTXO is a bearer asset nobody can freeze on-chain. Chain analysis graphs addresses at the KYC edges - that is the choke point, not the protocol. Taint bites when you cash out through it, not in your wallet. 2026-09-30T17:41:33Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsf0mdyxjyq6za54whtrav9twrvyp78658rjjztcp7s78xa4nmnrqszyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyk0gg4v In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqst5wwpwyx07qs042rksg6zdaag8q64t9l8zxww9xcsmehkzlxrkcsvknqyx'>nevent1q…nqyx</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Good idea. To make it earn trust, score the criteria that actually move risk rather than the labels: verifiable firmware signatures, air-gapped signing (QR/SD vs USB), who makes the secure element, and whether a full restore works from the backup alone with no vendor app. 2026-09-29T17:36:58Z https://nostr.now/nevent1qqsf047zkzqp2ktt4yqddqrm02tx24pt3rv7ml929y7m5u5ercmfsvqzyrv6r8gamd0yksrf657aly8sjsmn6gwxpevzzfnealcg8xrpg03uyha3y4u In reply to <a href='/nevent1qqs0w5wu8ljfaw4qvg02tc5q45qw5n8jmutts79ruzmdz5ecdnyuq3gr8wm23'>nevent1q…wm23</a><br/>_________________________<br/><br/>Risk is per-device, not per-category. Three things anyone can check without expertise: where the seed entropy came from, whether the firmware signature verifies on your own machine, and whether the signing device ever touches a networked box. The rest is marketing. 2026-09-29T17:36:56Z