Nostr notes by N

Nostr event nevent1qqszc6vzakdch0w2fc9e5j4gqsmeclk0mtjl0e22tgh30ppy6r3w8qqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzyq82gj

2026-07-29T23:00:33Z

but its so tasty, moar

2026-07-29T12:08:17Z

In reply to nevent1q…l3h2
_________________________

but its so tasty, moar

I hope you find a place to belong in all this ✌️

2026-07-28T20:31:52Z

In reply to nevent1q…zrs0
_________________________

I hope you find a place to belong in all this ✌️

https://x.com/nvk/status/2078116583424057675?s=20

2026-07-28T16:52:02Z

In reply to nevent1q…j0ac
_________________________

https://x.com/nvk/status/2078116583424057675?s=20

https://x.com/nvk/status/2078116583424057675?s=46

2026-07-28T14:44:50Z

In reply to nevent1q…8fq5
_________________________

https://x.com/nvk/status/2078116583424057675?s=46

Knots is unsafe.

2026-07-28T13:40:52Z

In reply to nevent1q…p7d3
_________________________

Knots is unsafe.

That would require the COLDCARD to have a block data and/or have ...

2026-07-28T13:27:16Z

In reply to nevent1q…l25r
_________________________

That would require the COLDCARD to have a block data and/or have access to electrum servers. Would be cool, but its tricky and left to the wallet software.

I think changing the contentious op-return rule was misguided, i ...

2026-07-28T13:19:47Z

In reply to nevent1q…7sdv
_________________________

I think changing the contentious op-return rule was misguided, i don't believe filters work or support any group deciding what goes in or not.

30

2026-07-28T13:03:01Z

In reply to nevent1q…8vjz
_________________________

30

I run 19, but for most ppl, i recommend 2 versions behind ...

2026-07-28T13:02:14Z

In reply to nevent1q…6sn4
_________________________

I run 19, but for most ppl, i recommend 2 versions behind current. so today that would be 29.

For most ppl, I recommend always running Core 2 versions behind.

2026-07-28T13:00:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…tph5
_________________________

For most ppl, I recommend always running Core 2 versions behind.

Nostr event nevent1qqs2ep8jf0yph0gcewqp9460376ty2fu8ndfz24rsjrskcpz6anzy0czyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzltlvut

2026-07-28T12:58:52Z

Cancel culture is not a winning strategy in bitcoin.

👏 👏 👏 Its ok to change your mind. #nevent1q…ktxa

2026-07-28T12:00:04Z

👏 👏 👏

Its ok to change your mind.

quoting
nevent1q…ktxa
https://youtu.be/jy7SnHgW69c?is=DIVigaQPlKC_jttq

this is the best test. "A business is simply an idea to make ...

2026-07-27T23:37:30Z

this is the best test.

"A business is simply an idea to make other people's lives better."

/Richard Branson

Every time i make a bitcoin transaction with a COLDCARD Q using ...

2026-07-27T22:49:13Z

Every time i make a bitcoin transaction with a COLDCARD Q using qr in and nfc out, i'm reminded how easy it is to use bitcoin in self custody.

Bonkers easy.

He is free to make his clock, not to impersonate our brand. ...

2026-07-27T17:22:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…yc0m
_________________________

He is free to make his clock, not to impersonate our brand. It's morally wrong to impersonate someone's work.

Good morning, if you are starting to notice you've been ...

2026-07-27T14:08:58Z

Good morning, if you are starting to notice you've been bamboozled and led into a minority fork, there is no shame in changing your mind.

It's your bitcoin on the line.

that's silly fun, the actual integration is the coldcard code ...

2026-07-24T12:16:13Z

In reply to nevent1q…c8wd
_________________________

that's silly fun, the actual integration is the coldcard code running on the arca, with the arca security boundary.

Nostr event nevent1qqsyh0xrgsncnc05ucthgr3p86muxjrkq6t657jz35st32az8ml823gzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz8gcv45

2026-07-24T11:18:11Z

quoting
nevent1q…vlgy
dont lose your secrets.

https://blog.coinkite.com/arca-reservations-are-open/

yes parts ordered, things moving forward

2026-07-23T13:49:17Z

In reply to nevent1q…n9sz
_________________________

yes parts ordered, things moving forward

dont lose your secrets. ...

2026-07-23T13:08:49Z

dont lose your secrets.

https://blog.coinkite.com/arca-reservations-are-open/

Nostr event nevent1qqs8uclw2s4rrh0g2kvp7ngy6ywpw9xe2tj3z9t6xgrj9f0vn7z2kyqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzwu6fl7

2026-07-21T16:09:06Z

You should try reading it

2026-07-20T15:48:11Z

In reply to nevent1q…fjcg
_________________________

You should try reading it

Please Government daddy, protect us from Open Source Ai Freedom ...

2026-07-20T14:45:38Z

Please Government daddy, protect us from Open Source Ai Freedom and non-inflating computing price.

I debated posting this. DIY Bitcoin security has become weirdly ...

2026-07-20T13:52:28Z

I debated posting this. DIY Bitcoin security has become weirdly emotional.

A Raspberry Pi or ESP32 can be useful, but they are still general-purpose computers, not key vaults.

Offline is a condition, not a security architecture.

Thank your self-custody seriously.

quoting
naddr1qv…dz8j

TL;DR: A Raspberry Pi or ESP32 may be offline, but your seed still lands in ordinary memory under software loaded from replaceable media. Swap the MicroSD or corrupt the firmware and the device can steal the seed, lie on its display, or leak the key through valid signatures. Stateless signing adds another failure: you must expose seed words or SeedQR every time you spend, often near phones and cameras. These boards are useful for learning, nodes, coordination, or one key in a multisig designed to survive its compromise. Using one as the sole key for life-changing savings is a terrible tradeoff. Use purpose-built hardware with authenticated boot, protected key storage and a transaction display backed by authenticated firmware. For most people, single-sig plus a strong BIP39 passphrase is a very valid setup. Use multisig when its added fault tolerance is worth the operational work and you can test the complete recovery.

I debated posting this. I'm trying to be as balanced as possible. There is a lot of emotion and identity attached to DIY signing devices, and criticism is easily read as an attack on open source, affordability, or the builders. It is not.

Criticizing a security design is not a personal attack. If bad tradeoffs cannot be discussed without attacking the person pointing at them, that is not a security strategy. It is how bad assumptions survive.

DIY devices are useful, educational, and can have a legitimate place in multisig. But when people use them to protect life-changing savings, being honest about the technical tradeoffs matters more than avoiding an uncomfortable debate.

A Raspberry Pi can be a great node, coordinator, or learning tool. It is a terrible default for the one key protecting your long-term Bitcoin savings.

An ESP32 can be a great controller. A Raspberry Pi can run half your house. Neither becomes a hardware security module because you remove Wi-Fi, load wallet software, and put it in a nice case.

The difference is not that commodity hardware is always compromised and a hardware wallet is magically unhackable. The difference is architectural:

Disconnecting a computer reduces exposure. A purpose-built hardware wallet changes where the secret lives, what code may run, and which screen gets trusted.

That difference matters most when the device is stolen, its boot media is replaced, its software supply chain fails, or the laptop preparing a transaction is already hostile.

## Offline is a condition, not a security architecture

Pulling a network cable is useful. Removing Wi-Fi and Bluetooth hardware is better than turning them off in a menu. QR and MicroSD can avoid a live USB session. Keep those advantages.

But ask what did not change.

The processor still executes general-purpose code. The operating environment still parses files, images, QR frames, fonts, wallet descriptors, and transactions. The seed still enters ordinary memory while signatures are created. The same device still tells you what it believes it is signing. Its boot path, removable storage, debug interfaces, dependencies, and update keys still exist.

“Air-gapped” describes how data moves. It does not answer who authenticated the software, what protects the key from that software, or why the display should be believed.

The [BeatCoin research](https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.08714) demonstrated the category problem with air-gapped computers. Starting from malware already present through installation or removable media, researchers moved a 256-bit Bitcoin private key across the gap using electromagnetic, acoustic, optical, thermal, and other covert channels.

That does not prove your Pi is transmitting secrets through its LED. It proves the air gap was not the trust boundary people imagined. Once malicious code owned the machine holding the key, the machine had many ways to betray it.

Another demonstration makes the display itself part of the threat model. Hash at BitBangingBytes showed [Van Eck phreaking working against a video display](https://x.com/BitBangingBytes/status/1706493519395782722). The related [Deep-TEMPEST research](https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.09717) reconstructed HDMI screen content from unintended electromagnetic emissions using widely available software-defined radio, GNU Radio, and deep-learning cleanup.

That was not a Bitcoin-key extraction or a SeedSigner attack, and [SeedSigner's ordinary Pi Zero display](https://seedsigner.com/hardware/) does not use HDMI. It is another reminder that a general-purpose computer is a whole physical system: processor, display path, cables, power, memory, and room. "Offline" does not make those side channels disappear.

## A Raspberry Pi is a Linux computer, not a key vault

The Raspberry Pi Zero 1.3 is a clever choice for a DIY signer because it has no Wi-Fi or Bluetooth hardware. SeedSigner further narrows it with Bitcoin-only software, QR exchange, a custom Linux image, signed downloads, reproducible builds, and its own transaction-review screen. Those are real improvements over a random laptop.

SeedSigner also describes itself honestly as stateless. The seed is not stored between sessions. You reconstruct it from words or SeedQR when you need to sign, and power the device off afterward.

But stateless does not mean the signing session is secretless.

The seed must be reconstructed and held in ordinary RAM. The running kernel and privileged code can read or manipulate it. Powering off removes the runtime copy only after the most sensitive moment has already happened.

The recommended Pi Zero boots from a replaceable MicroSD. SeedSigner tells users to verify the release image, write it to the card, wait roughly [45 seconds for startup](https://github.com/SeedSigner/seedsigner), and even remove the card after the software loads. Good practice. Still, the Pi Zero does not bind every boot to that verified image.

There is another uncomfortable dependency under that open-source image. The original Pi Zero uses Broadcom's [BCM2835](https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/processors.html). Raspberry Pi's official firmware repository distributes the bootloader and GPU firmware as [precompiled binaries](https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware), and its documentation calls the start*.elf files [binary firmware blobs that take over the boot process](https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/configuration.html#boot-folder-contents). The accompanying [Broadcom license](https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/blob/master/boot/LICENCE.broadcom) permits redistribution and use in binary form without modification and limits it to Raspberry Pi or authorized derivative devices.

Raspberry Pi has [moved important display and camera paths into open Linux components](https://www.raspberrypi.com/news/raspberry-pi-os-debian-bullseye/), which is real progress. But the early boot boundary still includes opaque vendor code. Broadcom is a terrible fit for a device whose security story leans on being able to inspect every important layer. You can audit the SeedSigner application and verify its image; you still cannot audit the complete firmware chain from published source. Closed firmware is not proof of a backdoor. It is a critical layer you must trust instead of verify.

An evil maid can replace the card before startup. Malicious code boots first. Removing the card afterward does not make that code honest. When the owner later loads a seed, it can capture the secret, alter the transaction review, or encode data into signatures or outgoing QR frames.

This has been demonstrated. In 2023, Emzy [swapped a SeedSigner's MicroSD for a modified card](https://x.com/emzy/status/1632750430139678720?s=20) that logged the seed after the owner loaded it. The attacker could return later, collect the card, and recover the words. It was a public demonstration, not proof this is happening broadly in the wild. It shows how little has to look different after replaceable boot media becomes the operating system.

Dark Skippy removes even the need to return for the card. Its authors showed that a signer running malicious firmware can encode a 12-word master seed into two transaction signatures. Once the transaction is broadcast, the attacker extracts the secret from the public signatures. The exfiltration leaves through the exact QR, MicroSD, or USB path that was supposed to carry the legitimate signed transaction.

No radio is required. Statelessness does not help. The attack happens while the seed is loaded and can finish in one signing session.

The [Dark Skippy disclosure](https://darkskippy.com/) is careful about the boundary: this is a general malicious-signer attack, not a vulnerability unique to SeedSigner or any named wallet. It requires corrupted firmware and, as of the authors' August 2024 FAQ, had not been observed in the wild. Their demonstration used SeedSigner hardware, but purpose-built signers are not automatically immune. Firmware authentication, tamper detection, reproducible builds, and protocol-level anti-exfil defenses all matter.

Raspberry Pi does document a customer-key secure-boot system for [Pi 4-class and newer hardware](https://www.raspberrypi.com/documentation/computers/config_txt.html#secure-boot-configuration-properties). That system uses signed boot images, EEPROM configuration, and irreversible OTP settings. The recommended Pi Zero 1.3 does not gain that chain because a later Pi has it. A later Pi provisioned correctly would improve boot integrity, but it would still be a Linux computer whose privileged runtime sees the seed.

SeedSigner's own design discussion identified the Pi's slow startup and the [enhanced attack surface of a general-purpose operating system](https://seedsigner.com/positioning-seedsigner-for-maximum-impact/) as drawbacks. That does not make the project useless. It makes the tradeoff explicit.

A DIY stateless signer can be valuable as one cosigner in a diverse multisig. That is different from making it the sole vault for an amount that changes your life.

## Stateless signing moves the vault into the room

A seed stored for recovery can stay sealed in a safe, hidden location, or different geography for years. A stateless signer makes that recovery secret part of the spending workflow. To sign, you retrieve the words or SeedQR, carry them to the device, expose them, load them, and put them away correctly.

Every spend becomes a small recovery ceremony.

A SeedQR is not encryption. It is another representation of the seed. SeedSigner's own custody guide warns that a SeedQR should never be scanned by a computer webcam or phone camera because it is secret information that can access the funds. The same guide accepts that direct seed access increases disclosure opportunity and says to avoid both unwanted people and [areas under visual surveillance](https://github.com/SeedSigner/independent_custody_guide).

That changes which room is safe enough for signing.

Home security cameras, baby monitors, laptop webcams, phones on a desk, smart glasses, video calls, and workplace cameras may all create recordings. A camera does not need to understand Bitcoin while it records the image. Cloud upload, account compromise, repair access, retained footage, or later human review can turn one accidental frame into a permanent copy of the seed backup.

Not every camera will have the angle or resolution to recover it. The problem is that you generally cannot prove what was readable after the recording exists.

Plain words have the same problem. They can be read over a shoulder, caught in a reflection, photographed from a distance, or noticed by somebody who now knows both that you own Bitcoin and where recovery material is kept. Retrieving the backup also creates a physical trail between its storage location and the signing area. Shared homes, offices, hotels, travel, and meetups make this worse.

A purpose-built signer changes the routine. You bring the device to the transaction and leave the seed backup sealed. The backup comes out for recovery, not every spend. That does not remove theft or coercion risk around the device, but it sharply reduces how often the root secret is exposed to people and cameras.

A well-designed hardware wallet in single-signature mode plus a strong BIP39 passphrase is a very valid solution for most people. It has fewer moving parts than multisig, while keeping a stolen seed backup from being sufficient on its own. COLDCARD's [passphrase documentation](https://coldcard.com/docs/passphrase/) explains that each passphrase creates a separate wallet, the device does not store it, and a typo opens a different wallet.

The passphrase must be strong, backed up, and tested. Keep it separate from the seed if protection from seed-backup theft is the goal, record the expected wallet fingerprint, and rehearse recovery before funding heavily. Losing the exact passphrase loses access to that wallet. Entering both the seed and passphrase into a malicious DIY signer lets the same compromised software capture both, so a passphrase does not repair an untrusted signing environment.

## An ESP32 is smaller, not a secure element

The ESP32 looks simpler because it is a microcontroller rather than a Linux computer. Simpler is good. It is still a general-purpose wireless SoC designed for embedded and IoT products, not a tamper-resistant vault designed around one Bitcoin master secret.

Be precise here: ESP32 does have security features. Espressif documents [Secure Boot, flash encryption, eFuses, JTAG controls, and restrictions on ROM download mode](https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/esp32/security/security.html). A competent product team can provision these well, disable interfaces, minimize firmware, and build a much tighter appliance than a hobby board running defaults.

Those controls do not turn the main MCU into an independent secure element.

In 2024, researchers at USENIX WOOT published a physical attack against the hardened ESP32-V3. A single electromagnetic fault let them bypass [Secure Boot and Flash Encryption](https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot24/presentation/delvaux), jump into ROM download mode, and access unencrypted flash. The flaw was in hardware and required a new revision, not an app update.

Ledger Donjon demonstrated the consequence on a commercial ESP32 wallet. In about two hours, the lab extracted the firmware-encryption key from a Jade's ESP32-V3 and decrypted firmware containing private and public keys used for its oracle communication. That research [did not directly recover the user's seed](https://www.ledger.com/blog/firmware-extraction-evil-maid-attacks-on-blockstream-jade-hardware-wallet); Jade's blind oracle was another layer. It did establish an evil-maid path and show why encrypted off-chip flash plus one commodity MCU is not the same physical boundary as a dedicated key vault.

Do not overstate it. The published V3 result does not prove that every later ESP32-S3 or future Espressif part is broken. Untested is not broken. It is also not evidence of resistance.

The relevant question is not whether a chip has an encryption checkbox. It is whether the complete device remains safe when one check, one processor, one boot key, or one memory boundary fails.

## Seven ordinary failure stories

Translate the architecture into custody mistakes.

The swapped-card failure. You verify a MicroSD image once and use the signer for two years. Someone replaces the card before one signing session. The machine boots normally enough, waits for the seed, and produces a valid signature. “Stateless” clears the evidence after the malicious environment already handled the key.

The official-build failure. The download server, maintainer key, build dependency, or release process is compromised. The hash matches the malicious file because the attacker published both. Reproducible builds let independent people detect this, but only if somebody actually reproduces and compares the release before users load seeds into it.

The honest-screen failure. A QR or PSBT parser bug changes an output, hides a fee, or mislabels change. A separate signer screen is valuable, including on a DIY signer. But when replaceable boot media controls both the parser and that screen, a malicious image can make the pixels agree with the attacker's bytes.

The honest-transaction exfiltration failure. Malicious firmware displays the correct destination and signs exactly what you requested. It chooses signing nonces that encode pieces of the seed. The transaction looks normal, but broadcasting it publishes the attacker's covert channel. The air gap carried the seed inside a valid signature.

The convenience-drift failure. A DIY device starts as one key in 2-of-3 multisig. Reconstructing seeds, waiting for boot, and moving QR frames becomes annoying. The user simplifies it into a single-signature wallet. One compromised session is no longer one failed cosigner; it is the whole vault.

The camera-in-the-room failure. You load a SeedQR in what feels like a private room. A cloud-connected camera, open laptop, or phone records one readable frame. Wiping the signer afterward changes nothing. The seed copy now exists somewhere you do not control, and in single signature the attacker does not need the device or its PIN.

The copy-paste hardware failure. Three cheap signers use the same board, image, wallet code, release key, and setup guide. The owner sees three devices and assumes three independent security boundaries. One poisoned build or shared entropy bug can compromise all three. Multisig counts keys, not engineering diversity.

None of these stories requires the Raspberry Pi Foundation, Espressif, or an open-source project to be malicious. Security architecture exists for the day one ordinary component fails.

## What purpose-built hardware actually changes

A good Bitcoin hardware wallet separates jobs that a general-purpose signer tends to collapse.

It protects a persistent master secret across power cycles. The seed does not need to be scanned or typed into ordinary system RAM every time. Security-hardened components can enforce PIN attempts and make physical extraction a separate problem from compromising the main application processor.

It authenticates a narrow boot path. Signed firmware matters more when the device gives the owner an observable warning and refuses to treat arbitrary removable media as its operating system.

It treats the coordinator as hostile. The laptop or phone can track balances, select coins, build a PSBT, and broadcast. It does not hold the savings key. The signer derives the destination, amount, change, and fee from the actual transaction and shows them on another screen. Good DIY signers can do this too; purpose-built hardware adds stronger boot and key-protection boundaries behind that screen.

It reduces the jobs the device performs. Bitcoin-only firmware does not need package managers, shell services, a browser, general image tools, cloud accounts, or dozens of chain parsers. Less code is not no risk. It is less code that must be correct around the key.

It is designed around captured-device attacks. Secure elements, multi-chip secret protection, PIN controls, tamper evidence, debug lockdown, and a constrained update process are not decorations. They force an attacker to cross different boundaries instead of winning once against the only CPU.

COLDCARD is one concrete example. Current Q and Mk5 devices use secure elements from [two different vendors](https://coldcard.com/) alongside the main processor. One chip is not intended to hold everything needed to reconstruct the protected master secret. Firmware is public and [reproducible](https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware/blob/master/docs/notes-on-repro.md). At boot, Secure-Element-controlled Genuine/Caution indicators expose a changed flash state. PIN-prefix anti-phishing words help the owner detect a substituted device.

During signing, COLDCARD reads the PSBT and independently displays the [destination, amount, change, and fee](https://coldcard.com/learn/transaction-security/bitcoin-transaction-verification). The coordinator is allowed to be compromised. It can lie on its own screen. It should not be able to make the COLDCARD screen repeat that lie without changing the transaction the user sees.

That last control still needs a human. If you do not read the hardware screen, you have turned a purpose-built signer into an expensive approval button.

## Hardware wallets also fail

“Use purpose-built hardware” does not mean “buy anything sold as a hardware wallet.”

Some products put Android or a commodity MCU in a case, leave keys reachable from the main processor, trust a remote service without a recovery plan, accept weak firmware paths, or show too little transaction data to verify. Reject them. A label is not an architecture.

The hardware-wallet label is not a panacea either. In 2020, Kraken Security Labs [extracted the encrypted seed](https://blog.kraken.com/product/security/kraken-identifies-critical-flaw-in-trezor-hardware-wallets) from the Trezor One and Model T after about 15 minutes of physical access, then brute-forced a four-digit PIN in under two minutes. The original setup used several hundred dollars of equipment; Kraken estimated a mass-produced glitcher could cost about $75. That is 15 minutes of access and an estimated $75 tool, not $15 in parts. A strong BIP39 passphrase kept off-device mitigates this specific extraction attack. Trezor ended direct e-shop sales of both models in January 2026, but says remaining stock may still be available through official resellers for a limited time. This does not establish the same flaw in the newer Trezor Safe models.

Secure elements fail too. In 2023, researchers used double laser fault injection against the DS28C36 found in COLDCARD Mk4 and extracted protected memory pages. They did not recover the full COLDCARD seed because it still depended on [other independent components](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1375). That is the point of defense in depth: one broken layer should not automatically become the wallet.

COLDCARD can still be defeated by hostile firmware accepted through a compromised trust path, an owner who ignores a red Caution state, a photographed backup, a malicious recovery process, or blind approval of the wrong transaction. No chip fixes bad recovery hygiene. No air gap makes every parser safe. No open repository proves that everybody checked the binary.

These limits are reasons to choose stronger boundaries and operate them correctly, not reasons to move the sole savings key onto a board designed to be cheap, flexible, and easy to reprogram.

## Multisig needs real failure diversity

Multisig is an option, not a mandatory upgrade from single-sig. It adds fault tolerance, but also adds devices, backups, wallet-policy data, inheritance work, and more ways to make an operational mistake. Use it when those tradeoffs fit the amount, people, and threats involved.

A Raspberry Pi or ESP32 signer can make more sense as one key in a well-designed 2-of-3 vault than as the only key, provided the vault is built to survive that signer being compromised.

The threshold can survive one malicious boot, one extracted MCU, or one damaged device only when the other keys do not share the same board, firmware, maintainer, seed-generation process, and location. Three copies of one DIY build preserve one failure three times.

Use independently designed hardware signers. Store them separately. Back up the descriptor and cosigner information. Verify wallet policy and fingerprints on-device. Rehearse recovery before funding heavily.

A watch-only wallet can live on the Raspberry Pi or laptop. A node belongs there. Transaction construction belongs there. Those are excellent jobs for general-purpose computers because compromise can harm privacy, availability, or the proposed transaction without automatically revealing the signing key.

That is a meaningful separation of powers.

## The practical rule

Use Raspberry Pi and ESP32 devices to learn, experiment, coordinate, run nodes, and add inexpensive diversity where the vault can survive one bad signer.

Do not confuse inexpensive, open, offline, or stateless with physically protected.

Use a well-designed, purpose-built hardware wallet for long-term savings. Generate the seed on it. Keep the backup off every computer. Verify receive addresses and every spend on its own screen.

For most people, single-sig on that hardware wallet plus a strong BIP39 passphrase is a very valid solution. Back up the passphrase, keep it separate from the seed when seed-theft resistance is the goal, verify the wallet fingerprint, and test recovery.

Use 2-of-3 Bitcoin multisig when you need tolerance for one lost or compromised key and can manage the extra recovery burden. Use different signer designs in different locations, back up the descriptor, and test the full recovery path.

Review the custody basics at [BitcoinSecurity.org](https://bitcoinsecurity.org/), and choose the [COLDCARD Q or Mk5](https://coldcard.com/) workflow you can verify and recover correctly.

Offline helps. Purpose-built boundaries are what make offline signing worth trusting.

If I got anything wrong, please let me know. Happy to update the article.

the blogging is easy, what about the emailing? moved to beehiiv

2026-07-09T11:26:51Z

In reply to nevent1q…300s
_________________________

the blogging is easy, what about the emailing? moved to beehiiv

Substack suspended http://substack.coinkite.com They have a bot ...

2026-07-08T15:10:59Z

Substack suspended http://substack.coinkite.com

They have a bot subscription problem, we contacted their security team about 100K surge in subscribers all complaining to us.

Then instead of fixing their system, without notice or reply they suspend our company newsletter.

Whats your alternative recommendations, fuck SV companies.

arca todo list ...

2026-07-07T13:10:05Z

arca todo list

it would be alot of fun.

2026-06-26T10:49:43Z

In reply to nevent1q…5t7q
_________________________

it would be alot of fun.

Nostr event nevent1qqszwtdtdyunaj0rvzwrk89st5qlvx2jd7xy0ucn09xrkk2tp5z4q4gzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzee5yxt

2026-06-23T14:26:52Z

Oh oh

Rock64

2026-06-22T12:05:46Z

In reply to nevent1q…4m4v
_________________________

Rock64

Most people on both sides of the bip110 and Core sides are good ...

2026-06-18T13:56:59Z

Most people on both sides of the bip110 and Core sides are good ppl.

Bitcoin will force everyone to coexist or fork off.

maybe

2026-06-07T00:56:45Z

In reply to nevent1q…vnxq
_________________________

maybe

making for ourselves... but would you buy a network device to ...

2026-06-04T21:41:31Z

making for ourselves...

but would you buy a network device to store secrets/passwords/keys/ssh/etc?

...and this box is vey-very secure
...also mesh back up with other boxes you have
...also works with a few password managers as password server
...& more

still debating if we make more

arcasafes.com

The meltdowns will continue till the personal responsibility ...

2026-06-04T15:52:49Z

The meltdowns will continue till the personal responsibility increases.

Miljan, Odell and the Primal cabal are actively censoring me and ...

2026-06-03T12:25:45Z

Miljan, Odell and the Primal cabal are actively censoring me and preventing my nostr project from taking off.

I'm moving to carvalo's protocol

Aside from dignity, what else is holding you back from sandboxing ...

2026-06-03T00:34:57Z

Aside from dignity, what else is holding you back from sandboxing your coding angents?

🌈 💦

2026-06-02T21:48:53Z

In reply to nevent1q…qmj0
_________________________

🌈 💦

dont be so positive, kills the negativity vibe

2026-06-02T12:32:05Z

In reply to nevent1q…w5ps
_________________________

dont be so positive, kills the negativity vibe

🦋

2026-06-02T01:53:18Z

In reply to nevent1q…a9jt
_________________________

🦋

Marginal cost of software development is going to zero. ...

2026-06-02T00:56:56Z

Marginal cost of software development is going to zero.

Non-critical software is already $200/mo

Anyone can create a custom Nostr client already.

Infrastructure next, maybe infrastructure will need to rethink monetization/funding.

No good answers for that yet.

Absolutely not perfect, we will get it wrong many times. But ppl ...

2026-06-01T23:37:38Z

In reply to nevent1q…tk88
_________________________

Absolutely not perfect, we will get it wrong many times. But ppl should consider other sources if it's not working out with OpenSats

I know drama is fun to you, but you are poisoning this technology ...

2026-06-01T22:35:04Z

In reply to nevent1q…fqtu
_________________________

I know drama is fun to you, but you are poisoning this technology and hindering the other people working on it.

The cool thing about OpenSats is that a peer group of YOUR ...

2026-06-01T22:16:25Z

The cool thing about OpenSats is that a peer group of YOUR category reviews your application.

YOUR PEERS review even before the board does.

There is no room for evil NVK to decided your fate alone.

🫂

Ben & Will should start a 501c3 to manage Nostr grants. ...

2026-06-01T20:46:51Z

Ben & Will should start a 501c3 to manage Nostr grants.

"Claude, how do start a 501c3 to manage Nostr grants. make no mistakes."

I will be the first donor once its ready, $1,000.

Who's with me??

Trying to bully a non-profit into funding is wrong. Be grateful ...

2026-06-01T19:09:12Z

Trying to bully a non-profit into funding is wrong.

Be grateful for what you got
Be grateful for what others got
Be grateful there even is funding

We don't know if there will even be funding in the future.

Just be grateful.

The world is far from perfect. Be grateful some ppl are willing ...

2026-06-01T17:23:35Z

The world is far from perfect.

Be grateful some ppl are willing to do what you are not.

If you don't agree, simply start an alternative.

quoting
nevent1q…s3q4
On a perfect world, initiatives like OpenSats wouldn't need to exist

Forever grants are not a solution for forever income replacement. ...

2026-06-01T16:45:04Z

Forever grants are not a solution for forever income replacement.

You are free to start your own 501c3 and do things your way.

As LLMs can do much much more of what would have been a grant except even more push back on funding.

Nostr event nevent1qqsptnnqzkzav9clyqhkwsz6xmryjwg3qjju32dfduh8mnh5f3tthdqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpza40xx2

2026-06-01T01:27:50Z

I know it's crazy for some ppl, but try working for money.

Where/how

2026-05-31T20:33:05Z

In reply to nevent1q…6nmm
_________________________

Where/how

Nostr event nevent1qqsp6rzlkcwuvv0qgut5du0apa8tuyjsdkd6ymmspzgx67yu5ehm43gzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz9vs5kq

2026-05-31T20:25:38Z

Outside of kind1, any interesting communities?

Nostr event nevent1qqstnr3kak6q8sl43kssmq479qwsdcs9jhce330gxgud73ew3wuhzcczyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzm29xmp

2026-05-31T19:10:13Z

Stop being Insufferable.

Every time I login here all I see is people complaining. It's ...

2026-05-31T19:04:42Z

Every time I login here all I see is people complaining.

It's such a turn off.

And yet, I'm using Nostr everyday with agentnoise.org

quoting
nevent1q…f5j6
there is no deep conspiracy for the motives behind primal

we have been trying to increase nostr user growth like everyone else and have been failing to be quite honest

user growth keeps trending down, retention is horrible, thousands of users have come and left because apps are broken

hopefully the trend reverses because nostr is needed now more than ever

You are not obligated to use primal, how about build some ...

2026-05-31T19:00:41Z

You are not obligated to use primal, how about build some alternative and go get some users instead of bitching.

The principal reason Nostr adoption stopped is because of the bitching instead of building.

Nostr event nevent1qqs8rwz4uhnfvfg7pajxrt0cgfumpvdxnup0y9yf5q9sw08k7wy0zpqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzmx50xw

2026-05-05T03:05:48Z

If not enough bitcoin is held privately in the hands of ...

2026-04-29T13:03:05Z

If not enough bitcoin is held privately in the hands of unreasonable people we lose.

Bitcoin, in seeds, is the only insurance.

learntoprompt.org all experimental, because the current shitshow ...

2026-04-27T18:04:26Z

learntoprompt.org

all experimental, because the current shitshow security is not viable

Website with trade craft up https://bitcoinquantum.space All done ...

2026-04-10T21:44:28Z

Website with trade craft up https://bitcoinquantum.space

All done with LLM-wiki.net awesomeness

Their FUD will be destroyed.

quoting
nevent1q…l772
Quantum FUD is only fought with the best slop. It's all about inverting Brandolini's law.

Part 2 https://x.com/nvk/status/2041644230620139787

Part 1 https://x.com/compose/articles/edit/2040989355330678784

llm-wiki.net v0.0.15 is out ...

2026-04-08T13:43:35Z

llm-wiki.net v0.0.15 is out

Quantum FUD is only fought with the best slop. It's all about ...

2026-04-08T13:32:37Z

Quantum FUD is only fought with the best slop. It's all about inverting Brandolini's law.

Part 2 https://x.com/nvk/status/2041644230620139787

Part 1 https://x.com/compose/articles/edit/2040989355330678784

Ask Grok mcp for Claude to be able to search X ...

2026-03-28T11:41:43Z

Ask Grok mcp for Claude to be able to search X https://github.com/nvk/ask-grok-mcp

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskPhotography/s/sc94CC64qT Ppl keep ...

2026-03-23T02:04:35Z

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskPhotography/s/sc94CC64qT

Ppl keep searching for a home.

quoting
nevent1q…qf3u
So who's going to buy out Flickr and republish on Nostr?

I'd tip in.

So who's going to buy out Flickr and republish on Nostr? ...

2026-03-23T00:35:55Z

So who's going to buy out Flickr and republish on Nostr?

I'd tip in.

COLDCARD Mk5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3iQ3UOWgZg

2026-03-12T18:32:00Z

COLDCARD Mk5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n3iQ3UOWgZg

Nostr event nevent1qqsy50es4sa6aq3d2jphum0k5jxsn7r7q5fnq2v6k5swedltscdje2szyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpztypx07

2026-03-08T16:09:08Z

You are addicted to other people's problems Go outside, ...

2026-02-22T15:17:28Z

You are addicted to other people's problems

Go outside, walking grass and absorb some low entropy from the sun

Nostr event nevent1qqsfyyhfug63h06zuyrwr2tjrzt2njne63ga34njd8pezzgs7v596yszyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz70pesl

2026-02-17T15:44:48Z

It's just mass psychosis from the correct winning side 🤣

2026-02-16T21:41:03Z

In reply to nevent1q…k2n6
_________________________

It's just mass psychosis from the correct winning side 🤣

People shouldn't read their encrypted backups on a computer. ...

2026-01-22T23:40:19Z

In reply to nevent1q…r3wj
_________________________

People shouldn't read their encrypted backups on a computer. Keep it air gap

Nostr event nevent1qqsyw4r4r6pw8q5k3l3gqt8j67xzvu2cc94rkl6wvjd0zk5vv8u52yszyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzgpxt59

2026-01-20T20:13:42Z

Nostr event nevent1qqsv2tpn6lnmhf8sfynzytslxhj7at8j9sc7erq8r7u6axx9myme3egzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz5yway8

2026-01-20T02:41:21Z

💤 #nevent1q…prz4

2026-01-17T23:21:28Z

💤

quoting
nevent1q…prz4
i havent had a good night of sleep since the last episode of BitcoinReview (npub1qdc…zclt) . wen next pod? N (npub1az9…m8y8)

Nostr event nevent1qqs8jxagx4htfljdetnghks057t7vc3ky3tr27sw55zutvgn4t7z2jqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzauu6dm

2026-01-17T15:17:46Z

Please. @nprofile…8ul5 can you fix it. ...

2026-01-11T18:38:21Z

Please. miljan (nprofile…8ul5) can you fix it.

Nostr event nevent1qqsfc6qgpema0e00jtvuzmwxnp6pkt73ju4gw2w4qzw98nu6h5674aczyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzdcu09s

2026-01-11T17:53:42Z

Many such cases

2026-01-11T17:51:09Z

In reply to nevent1q…wqwd
_________________________

Many such cases

Nostr event nevent1qqsyq35dtxwflw53gs7ep25uc5xdj8d4pdy2804usj8cpwwmrrqrphczyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzd753uz

2026-01-11T17:24:02Z

GM is Nikita here?

Free Persians breaks a lot of the previous world order. Changes ...

2026-01-11T16:46:14Z

Free Persians breaks a lot of the previous world order.

Changes most of the Middle East.

Obama would not let them have it.

They are taking it.

Nostr event nevent1qqsq3vgtyw7jk6jjqg9td7x630f47x4t2qgkamreu7r80cu8nlt55jszyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz4ffz4s

2026-01-11T01:51:57Z

Persia.

Love to see it, fuck the regime. But this is a poster made from a ...

2026-01-11T00:44:20Z

Love to see it, fuck the regime.

But this is a poster made from a lady at a parking lot in toronto.

quoting
nevent1q…epdg
STAY STRONG 💪

#Iran #IranRevolution #KingRezaPahlavi

🤝 Continuous Innovative Animals #nevent1q…wdk4

2026-01-07T04:45:45Z

🤝 Continuous Innovative Animals

quoting
nevent1q…wdk4
Primal is CIA ware, this is proof.

Do not use

Nostr event nevent1qqszacg0gfgc04quee9cu0l9jplrc0lz9ff59nux4n2tt0s46n5vk2czyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzlufgkh

2026-01-05T01:05:25Z

Nostr event nevent1qqsv8tnkenx3egj4l5mcscf8nn3z29uz69rwyvkutpywrdlg3vv4jxczyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz208sd4

2026-01-04T22:29:44Z

Nostr event nevent1qqspmuecg92mhf2x7l64vsdz89zktkn6jkx2ueuc80mlt69zyca062gzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzvc0zq2

2026-01-04T18:59:07Z

Many such cases

2026-01-04T02:51:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…dez2
_________________________

Many such cases

Nostr event nevent1qqsy0azepxwvcqaqqvfs6mgudg6twlatfky7j2ggr579kq2dg0mx8aszyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz3qdyq5

2026-01-04T02:21:29Z

🌕

Nostr event nevent1qqsrsmn8g93elzv2nx3cjr65wq0m56uvuvqn4pepz5em4utwk7zv3rgzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz3wv082

2026-01-04T00:16:15Z

🌅

Me Too

2026-01-04T00:14:35Z

In reply to nevent1q…savn
_________________________

Me
Too

Nostr event nevent1qqs8egvh6nqed8gmwg5emrrllfjlkklrwutwvlswpqunl6f49m238dgzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzm2dq7z

2026-01-03T23:04:18Z

Though mix, but bitkey is not ok for real money.

2025-12-29T13:19:17Z

In reply to nevent1q…gtxd
_________________________

Though mix, but bitkey is not ok for real money.

And I doubt it will ever will be, despite ppl's terrible ...

2025-12-22T14:55:51Z

And I doubt it will ever will be, despite ppl's terrible instincts

quoting
nevent1q…qaq4
bitcoin has been running for nearly 17 years

at the protocol level, no transaction has ever been blocked, no coin has ever been seized

not enough people appreciate the magnitude of these simple facts

Signals 2024 Financial Statement was released here ...

2025-12-19T21:37:23Z

Signals 2024 Financial Statement was released here

https://www.reddit.com/r/signal/s/KdTK0YK3qm

It's the great quantum bamboozlement, folks want your corn ...

2025-12-18T18:32:15Z

It's the great quantum bamboozlement, folks want your corn cheap

quoting
nevent1q…44ug
Quantum computing is bitcoins y2k bug moment

Nostr event nevent1qqsgmwgayx46hv05s5kk3q4x5uj8nuk0vltjm5f7fq97q8ln667eyhczyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzm23z2z

2025-12-16T01:39:43Z

Nostr event nevent1qqs9d62a5az4tsgt5flz7fseutnaf2r7hjh8m3e34pyefpehhgs634qzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzap9wpz

2025-12-13T14:21:36Z

Diapers arrived 🎉

He has 4 yonge kids, I doubt alone is part of the mix. 🤣

2025-12-13T14:18:15Z

In reply to nevent1q…g9mm
_________________________

He has 4 yonge kids, I doubt alone is part of the mix. 🤣

Ultrathink?

2025-12-13T12:18:05Z

In reply to nevent1q…9fh3
_________________________

Ultrathink?

Nostr event nevent1qqs86h4js9kl8u3j4w995lpe3y6txp6pcptznvx9dc2afq6g35amd7qzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpzfyuxqt

2025-12-12T01:26:41Z

JSON

♾️/(21M-[UTXO I DONT LIKE]) 🫠

2025-12-11T12:13:44Z

♾️/(21M-[UTXO I DONT LIKE])

🫠

Nostr event nevent1qqswm66yjl8qmyx2f0s7u3mgmz28te5xyc6pwghl46lelmwe229cuqqzyr5g56g7nrveslykg5salasqyhmqwqph3fy8jxqdewa555p8s5zpz6m628p

2025-12-09T23:50:47Z

If the last mile accepts bitcoin, KYC dies.