Tom Nomad on Nostr: To begin to even plan an operation like this, detailed intelligence would need to ...

To begin to even plan an operation like this, detailed intelligence would need to have been obtained, including what was ordered, including model numbers, and details about the shipment. Then, Israeli intelligence would have likely acquired 3000 of the same models of pager (likely through a series of intermediaries). These pagers were then modified to contain a small explosive charge and an electronic switch.

That switch was triggered by receiving a specific message, meaning that they also had to modify the firmware on the devices for this functionality. By extension, that also means that in the short amount of time this operation had to take place, likely under a month, they reverse engineered the devices, modified firmware, and figured out how to reflash the devices in a repeatable, consistent way, with stable software. Those of us that work in low level tech can attest to just how difficult this would be to do.

After modifying the pagers they would need to have found a point of entry to the shipment. This could have happened at the point of production, but that would involve sharing operational details with untrusted companies, so this is unlikely. More likely they either had the shipping company allow them to access a warehouse to swap the real shipment with the modified one, or, more likely, they did so while the shipment was going through customs in a friendly country.

This means that not only does Hezbollah have a leak in their supply chain, likely more than one, but they also do not check devices after receiving them and before distribution (we will talk about that later).