America Can't Stockpile Missiles Without Reloading On Conflict-Free Critical Materials
Authored by Anthony Milewski of https://theoregongroup.com/commodities/tungsten/the-missile-race-is-becoming-a-race-for-critical-minerals/,
Sixteen days of the Iran war left coalition forces needing an https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/over-11000-munitions-16-days-iran-war-command-reload-governs-endurance 4,000kg of tungsten just to replace the expended gun ammunition — but US mines produced none of the metal in 2025 and, instead, China accounted for https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf.
And it's not just tungsten.
In a https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/over-11000-munitions-16-days-iran-war-command-reload-governs-endurance, researchers estimated coalition forces expended more than 11,000 munitions in the first 16 days. And https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/key-us-munitions-are-dangerously-low-bloomberg-economics-says?srnd=homepage-americas will require secure access to a wide range critical minerals — from antimony to copper, rare earths to titanium — that make advanced weapon systems possible.
And the West's exposure, especially dependence on Chinese supply, is substantial.
"If the war in https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/winning-industrial-war-comparing-russia-europe-and-ukraine-2022-24 was a https://www.csis.org/analysis/defense-industrial-base-lessons-russia-ukraine-conflict-focus for the https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/05/heres-what-ukraine-needs-in-missiles-shells-and-troops.html, the first 16 days of the Iran conflict are a fire alarm signalling a crisis of endurance" — https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/over-11000-munitions-16-days-iran-war-command-reload-governs-endurance
Material risk matrix from https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/these-materials-could-cripple-americas-defense-industrial-base/. The authors' scores show relative risks, not measured percentages.
The critical mineral risks behind the weaponry
In their August 2025 https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/these-materials-could-cripple-americas-defense-industrial-base/, Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, Clarkson Kamurai and Jahara Matisek, ranks across two broad tiers:
- https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/these-materials-could-cripple-americas-defense-industrial-base/ are gallium, the battery-chemicals chain, tungsten, and graphite
- https://warontherocks.com/cogs-of-war/these-materials-could-cripple-americas-defense-industrial-base/ includes titanium sponge, germanium, antimony, indium, magnesium, and molybdenum, with nitrocellulose and finish-line capacity in specialty steels and aerospace aluminum (requiring near-term hedges because surge capacity is slow to add)
The assessment combines concentration of supply, military importance, limited substitutes and the time needed to add capacity. For example, refining, separation and specialised finishing are frequent constraints https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/19c60aa0-ee07-4a20-a138-33c967ac5008/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2026.pdf that leaves part of the exposure intact.
Across ammunition, missiles and supporting military systems, six critical mineral priorities stand out:
- Magnet rare earths, including samarium, specialised magnets support military aircraft, missiles and control systems, making a secure https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3700059/dod-looks-to-establish-mine-to-magnet-supply-chain-for-rare-earth-materials/ strategically important
- Tungsten, its role in https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/tungsten-statistics-and-information connects mineral supply to both weapons and the equipment used to manufacture them
- Antimony, antimony trisulfide is used in ammunition primers; defence support for https://www.investors.perpetuaresources.com/investors/news/perpetua-resources-awarded-department-of-defense-funding-to-study-antimony-from-stibnite-gold-project connects mine development to that requirement
- Gallium, its semiconductor applications support radar and military communications; the Pentagon announced a https://ebs.publicnow.com/view/AB6B9EDDFE5E34255E2AA8E591CD80216ED66AF2 in August 2026
- Germanium, infrared optics and thermal-sensing equipment need dependable material supply; the Defense Logistics Agency has supported https://www.dla.mil/About-DLA/News/News-Article-View/Article/3075059/dla-program-introduces-domestic-germanium-recycling-capability/
- Titanium, strong, lightweight materials are essential to military aerospace; defence backing for https://iperionx.com/2025/02/18/iperionx-awarded-47-1m-by-the-u-s-dod-to-secure-u-s-titanium-supply-chains/ illustrates the effort to expand alternative supply
For example, tungsten and gallium illustrate America's (and the West's) vulnerability because they underpin both weapons and the systems that support them: tungsten is used in https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/tungsten-statistics-and-information, while gallium enables https://www.rtx.com/news/news-center/2026/06/03/rtxs-raytheon-awarded-515-million-contract-for-spy-6-family-of-radars. Yet, China accounted for approx https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf in 2025, exposing these capabilities to highly concentrated mineral supply chains.
An arsenal built on imported minerals
US vulnerability extends across the critical-mineral supply chain.
A https://www.gao.gov/assets/890/887977.pdf reported that the US was fully import-dependent for 12 critical minerals and relied on imports for at least half its requirements for another 34.
https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf. Total import reliance is for 2025; China's share of imports covers 2021–24. The two measures have different denominators
Despite recent government funding, the scale of the challenge for the US remains significant, for example:
- recycling and substitution can help, but their contribution varies, with the US Government Accountability Office warning that https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108687.
- the https://theoregongroup.com/latest-news/why-antimonys-supply-crisis-is-far-from-over/ illustrates the scale of that challenge with S&P Global's August 2026 assessment estimating that, even if announced projects proceed, https://www.spglobal.com/content/dam/spglobal/global-assets/en/special-reports/critical-mineral-market-reports/Market%2520Report%2520-%2520Antimony%2520-%252008052026.pdf. It also warned that new processing facilities could face shortages of mine feedstock
- a https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/HISPBC2025_DirectorsAward_2025.pdf, citing Stanford research, recounts a defence contractor tracing a titanium supply chain through 13 tiers to Chinese mines and transport infrastructure — leading directly to "Chinese mines, Chinese roads, and Chinese trucks"
The Pentagon is increasingly explicit about the stakes.
"Securing resilient domestic and allied supply chains is a fundamental warfighting requirement," said Mike Cadenazzi, the Pentagon's assistant secretary responsible for industrial base policy, in an https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4581110/department-of-war-announces-a-750-million-investment-as-part-of-a-155-billion-i/.
Acting Secretary of the Army Honorable Adam Telle https://www.army.mil/article-amp/296069/army_announces_first_ever_manufacturing_rodeo, describing it as a competitive stress test for both the Army's organic industrial base and the nation's broader manufacturing network.
Meanwhile, the https://theoregongroup.com/commodities/copper/military-rearmament-is-just-getting-started-without-enough-critical-minerals/ are becoming more pressing. Global military expenditure reached a https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2026/global-military-spending-rise-continues-european-and-asian-expenditures-surge, with European spending rising 14% in real terms. US expenditure fell that year, but the wider rearmament cycle continued. Larger budgets create purchasing power; they cannot immediately create additional mineral supply.
Tungsten shows why securing supply takes more than money
The four tonnes of tungsten used in the weapons fired in the 11 days of the Iran War is a relatively small quantity in the wider tungsten market (the US https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026.pdf) — but securing dependable supplies outside China increasingly means committing years ahead.
In July 2026, US processor Global Tungsten & Powders extended its agreement for approximately https://almonty.com/almonty-expands-sangdong-tungsten-offtake-agreement-with-global-tungsten-powders/; buyers seeking additional material face a market where substantial volumes of new supply already have a customer.
And China has tightened access to its own production after, in February 2025, Beijing introduced https://exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/article/hgfw/lywxcx/gzqd/202502/1102.html. https://www.spglobal.com/content/dam/spglobal/global-assets/en/special-reports/critical-mineral-market-reports/Market%2520Report%2520-%2520Tungsten%2520-%252008052026.pdf found that prices more than quadrupled between January-July in 2026.
(See our recent article https://theoregongroup.com/commodities/tungsten/tungsten-price-shock-signals-deeper-supply-crisis/)
US sourcing requirements are tightening too: from January 2027, https://www.acquisition.gov/node/36574/printable/print, generally excluding Chinese-origin material even when processed elsewhere, subject to specified exceptions.
Turning defence demand into secure mineral supply
The clearest evidence of the strategic urgency is Washington's growing intervention in mining finance — particularly domestic projects — including:
- MP Materials' https://investors.mpmaterials.com/investor-news/news-details/2025/MP-Materials-Announces-Transformational-Public-Private-Partnership-with-the-Department-of-Defense-to-Accelerate-U-S--Rare-Earth-Magnet-Independence/default.aspx combined equity, a ten-year price floor for neodymium-praseodymium products, long-term magnet purchases and financing
- the Pentagon's https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2101698/000121390026099734/ea0304682-8k_elmet.htm for tungsten mining in Nevada, including an initial US$200 million investment closed in September 2026
- USA Rare Earth's https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2026/06/department-commerces-chips-program-finalizes-definitive-agreement-usa-rare provides access to approx US$1.6 billion, to support the Round Top mining and processing project in Texas and expand US metal and magnet production
- the Pentagon's https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4581110/department-of-war-announces-a-750-million-investment-as-part-of-a-155-billion-i/ forms part of a US$1.55 billion financing structure supporting an offtake agreement, alongside a US$300 million Defense Logistics Agency purchase commitment and US$500 million bank commitment
- The Pentagon's https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4587183/department-of-war-announces-174-million-investment-to-secure-gallium-supply-cha/ will support construction of a facility at Alcoa's Wagerup refinery, projected to produce 100 tonnes annually, through a partnership involving Australia and Japan
- The US International Development Finance Corporation's https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-highlights-landmark-critical-minerals-investments-strengthen-us-national closed in January 2026. By July, its board had https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-ceo-ben-black-gives-opening-remarks-hearing-ending-supply-chain-dependency to support a portfolio of critical-mineral projects, including a proposed investment in copper and cobalt operations in the DRC
Conclusion
Before America can reload its missile stockpiles, it must first reload its critical-mineral supply chains — potentially making the mining companies capable of delivering those materials at scale strategic pillars of the US defense industrial base.
* * *
Our Take
The Oregon Group's assessment that the US must "reload its critical-mineral supply chains" before accelerating the rearmament supercycle reinforces our focus on miners already producing these materials.
Yet a sharp disconnect has emerged between mining stocks and underlying spot metal prices.
We highlighted that divergence in "https://www.zerohedge.com/commodities/great-rare-earth-disconnect-prices-23-miners-down-28,"; a view shared by William Blair analysts, which suggested that rare earth stocks trading at 52-week lows...
... may present a https://www.zerohedge.com/commodities/rare-earth-stocks-hit-52-week-low-william-blair-says-china-supply-optimism-incorrect, arguing that optimism surrounding Chinese supply is "incorrect."
https://cms.zerohedge.com/users/tyler-durden
Sun, 10/25/2026 - 21:00
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/america-cant-stockpile-missiles-without-reloading-conflict-free-critical-materials