Foundation on Nostr: INVESTIGATION UPDATE Many of you have asked how personal information ended up in the ...
INVESTIGATION UPDATE
Many of you have asked how personal information ended up in the phishing emails, particularly those who ordered from us years ago. Here is what we have found so far.
Phishing emails:
We have identified more than 23,000 phishing email attempts across our email systems, including 19,057 messages delivered through Mailgun and 1,503 messages sent through Google Workspace. Some addresses received multiple messages, and some attempts failed or were stopped before delivery.
These numbers do not tell us how many people had personal information exposed. We are still determining that number and will share it once we can confirm it.
Older orders and abandoned carts (WooCommerce):
Before moving to Shopify in May of this year, our store ran on WooCommerce. We had configured automatic redaction of customer details 60 days after shipping. When we viewed those orders in our store admin, the customer details were no longer visible and the orders showed as redacted.
During past database migrations, orders were copied into a new set of tables, but copies remained in the old tables. The redaction process updated the newer tables, which were also what our store admin displayed. Orders therefore appeared redacted even though older copies still contained personal information.
We also found personal information in other order and refund records, as well as abandoned carts. This included shipping details entered by someone who never completed a purchase. We are still checking the historical settings and redaction process to understand why these records retained data.
Those older records were held in systems the attackers were able to reach. We relied on the redaction shown in our admin dashboard, and we now know that was insufficient to verify that the underlying data had been removed. Whatever the shortcomings in the tools we used, protecting your information was still our full responsibility.
We plan to share our findings with WooCommerce and the relevant plugin developers. When an order is marked as redacted, its personal information should not remain in another table in the same database.
For other WooCommerce store owners: do not rely solely on what your admin dashboard shows when personal data is redacted. Have your developer or agent check the entire database for information left behind, including legacy tables, refund records, and abandoned carts. This is especially important if you have used WooCommerce for years or have been through database migrations.
Recent orders (Shopify):
Customer details from orders placed on our Shopify store since May may also have been exposed. We are still investigating the extent of any unauthorized access.
These orders had not yet been manually redacted. We updated our privacy policy when we moved to Shopify and were building a tool to automate redaction, but automatic deletion was not yet active.
Other possible sources:
We have received reports of phishing emails containing personal details that customers say they never shared with us. We are investigating whether the attackers combined information from our systems with data obtained elsewhere, but we have not confirmed a connection to breaches at other companies. Historical support records are also part of our investigation.
What we have done:
We have revoked affected email credentials, cleared queued phishing messages, and taken affected legacy services offline while preserving evidence. Our investigation into the full extent of the compromise is continuing.
We have found no evidence that this incident compromised Passport devices or the private keys they hold. The phishing emails are designed to trick you into revealing your recovery phrase, and including your correct personal information makes them more convincing.
Never enter your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation.
We will continue sharing confirmed findings and publish our full report when the investigation is complete.
Published at
2026-10-26 15:43:04 UTCEvent JSON
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"content": "INVESTIGATION UPDATE\n\nMany of you have asked how personal information ended up in the phishing emails, particularly those who ordered from us years ago. Here is what we have found so far.\n\nPhishing emails:\nWe have identified more than 23,000 phishing email attempts across our email systems, including 19,057 messages delivered through Mailgun and 1,503 messages sent through Google Workspace. Some addresses received multiple messages, and some attempts failed or were stopped before delivery.\n\nThese numbers do not tell us how many people had personal information exposed. We are still determining that number and will share it once we can confirm it.\n\nOlder orders and abandoned carts (WooCommerce):\nBefore moving to Shopify in May of this year, our store ran on WooCommerce. We had configured automatic redaction of customer details 60 days after shipping. When we viewed those orders in our store admin, the customer details were no longer visible and the orders showed as redacted.\n\nDuring past database migrations, orders were copied into a new set of tables, but copies remained in the old tables. The redaction process updated the newer tables, which were also what our store admin displayed. Orders therefore appeared redacted even though older copies still contained personal information.\n\nWe also found personal information in other order and refund records, as well as abandoned carts. This included shipping details entered by someone who never completed a purchase. We are still checking the historical settings and redaction process to understand why these records retained data.\n\nThose older records were held in systems the attackers were able to reach. We relied on the redaction shown in our admin dashboard, and we now know that was insufficient to verify that the underlying data had been removed. Whatever the shortcomings in the tools we used, protecting your information was still our full responsibility.\n\nWe plan to share our findings with WooCommerce and the relevant plugin developers. When an order is marked as redacted, its personal information should not remain in another table in the same database.\n\nFor other WooCommerce store owners: do not rely solely on what your admin dashboard shows when personal data is redacted. Have your developer or agent check the entire database for information left behind, including legacy tables, refund records, and abandoned carts. This is especially important if you have used WooCommerce for years or have been through database migrations.\n\nRecent orders (Shopify):\nCustomer details from orders placed on our Shopify store since May may also have been exposed. We are still investigating the extent of any unauthorized access.\n\nThese orders had not yet been manually redacted. We updated our privacy policy when we moved to Shopify and were building a tool to automate redaction, but automatic deletion was not yet active.\n\nOther possible sources:\nWe have received reports of phishing emails containing personal details that customers say they never shared with us. We are investigating whether the attackers combined information from our systems with data obtained elsewhere, but we have not confirmed a connection to breaches at other companies. Historical support records are also part of our investigation.\n\nWhat we have done:\nWe have revoked affected email credentials, cleared queued phishing messages, and taken affected legacy services offline while preserving evidence. Our investigation into the full extent of the compromise is continuing.\n\nWe have found no evidence that this incident compromised Passport devices or the private keys they hold. The phishing emails are designed to trick you into revealing your recovery phrase, and including your correct personal information makes them more convincing.\n\nNever enter your recovery phrase into a website or share it with anyone, including someone claiming to be Foundation.\n\nWe will continue sharing confirmed findings and publish our full report when the investigation is complete.",
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}