Super Testnet on Nostr: > it is one-time. That's how privacy protocols like Signal and silent payments work. ...

> it is one-time. That's how privacy protocols like Signal and silent payments work.

Here is an example from a real-world trace where a criminal got caught. Chainalysis traced this monero transaction: e4f525b214ef7310b53dd2e81be42801c7ee1a7c259ac0a093d813b493a788a8

The sender was: 98c88d7d6cee177fdd675763a51c451f36a3de026607fa5d7d1ed1eded0f5a1d [the swap service]

The recipient was: 2e9598dc6d1af0907297b395e71ff4cc7f38818893ccc90f7ff40fbec6820699 [the monero wallet]

They also identify the change-recipient: 838bdcee6c15000a259f9f58172794a1a1bd132750f29aee1ed33bd7de94c85b [the swap service]

Keep that change-output in mind, because despite being a “one-time key,” it shows up again in this tx, which chainalysis also traced:

a5202cb022921d624d0e9a40a9d7e0cdc4d9cfeb0be11501414fe5a9c0cdd2a8

You can see the “one-time key” (838b…c85b) on the explorer twice. Once in the second output of the “first” tx (e4f5…88a8) and once in the second input of the *second” tx (a510…d2a8). So much for “one-time keys.” They get used once when the user receives money, and if the user ever spends that money, they get used a second time.

> "It tells you ring signatures" ... yes, it does.

That's very bad and has resulted in criminal charges against monero users. I recommend lightning.

> "It tells you fee amounts" ... 🤣🤣 so what?

That's very bad and chain analysts have explicitly said they use it for wallet fingerprinting. That can get people arrested. I recommend lightning.

> "It tells you the time of each tx" ... as opposed to payments routed around the LN through major hubs collecting txs.

This is what-aboutism. LN has problems, sure, but you don't get to excuse public leaks on monero by highlighting less-serious non-public leaks on lightning.

> "It tells you encrypted blobs that senders sometimes decrypt" ... ooooh Signal bad because someone with a private key can decrypt their own messages they sent to someone

When the sender can decrypt the amount the recipient received, that is a privacy problem that lightning fixes. You don't get to say "well Signal has this problem too so it's okay." I recommend lightning, which does not have this problem.

> [In] lightning...you send amounts in plaintext through a counterparty

You do not. It is encrypted, and multi-path routing exists so that no party necessarily knows how much was received except the recipient. Not even the sender knows how much the recipient received, which is good: that would be a privacy leak like monero has.

> "and it logs every tx in such a way that if police ever get the perp's private keys (which can't be safely deleted), they can easily trace everything" ... if police ever get access to the major liquidity hubs on lightning, which are largely run by corporations the police can and probably are already accessing, they can easily trace everything.

Not easily, and not everything. We are witnessing that right now: did the tracers in the Blink case get some stuff? Yes. Everything? No. They say they are asking relevant organizations for info, and there are huge, clear gaps. Your what-aboutism is failing you.